To remit, or not to remit: that is the question. A remittance field experiment  by Torero, Máximo & Viceisza, Angelino
T
ﬁ
M
a
b
a
A
R
R
A
A
J
C
D
D
K
R
F
R
E
1
(
r
t
2
t
m
e
(
0
(Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) 221–236
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal  of  Economic  Behavior  &  Organization
j ourna l h om epa ge: w ww.elsev ier .com/ locate / jebo
o  remit,  or  not  to  remit:  that  is  the  question.  A  remittance
eld  experiment
áximo  Toreroa,1,  Angelino  Viceiszab,∗
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2033 K Street NW,  Washington, DC 20006-1002, USA
Spelman College, 350 Spelman Lane SW,  Atlanta, GA 30314, USA
 r  t  i c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 23 December 2013
eceived in revised form 12 October 2014
ccepted 31 January 2015
vailable online 9 February 2015
EL classiﬁcation:
93
03
13
eywords:
emittance
ield experiment
emittance spending
l Salvador
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We conduct  a remittance  ﬁeld  experiment  among  Salvadoran  migrants  in  the  metro  DC
area.  Migrants  need  to decide  whether  or not  to remit  funds  to  a  recipient  in El Salvador
and  if  so  how  much.  We  maintain  a  (2 × 2) design  in which  the  remittance  budget  has  a  value
of $400  or  $200,  and  the remitted  funds  arrive  as  cash  or grocery  vouchers  that  are  non-
transferable  and  applicable  to  basic  necessities  that do not  include  alcohol  and cigarettes.
Each  migrant  is  randomly  allocated  to  one  of  the resulting  four treatments.  We  test  across
these  treatments  whether  control  over  remittance  spending  in  the  form  of grocery  vouchers
affects remittance  behavior.  We  ﬁnd  the  following.  Our  quantitative  ﬁndings  suggest  that
migrants  prefer  a remittance  to arrive  as cash  than  as  groceries  when  stakes  are high.  This
result  is  robust  to inclusion  of  a wide set  of  covariates  and  is consistent  with  a conceptual
framework  in  which  migrants  have  preferences  over  how  recipients  spend  remittances.  Our
qualitative  ﬁndings  suggest  that migrants  integrate  amounts  sent  in  the  experiment  with
the external  environment  for  sending  remittances.  We  explore  the  mechanisms  underlying
the main  effect  and  ﬁnd  that migrants  who  more  recently  sent  a remittance  and,  in certain
speciﬁcations,  male  migrants  exhibit  a greater  preference  for cash.  Some  implications  of
our ﬁndings  are discussed.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
Remittance ﬂows form an important source of income and development for many developing countries. The World Bank
2011) estimates that $325 billion in remittances went to developing countries in 2010, representing close to 75% of total
emittance ﬂows. While the impacts of remittances seem to be relatively well understood and there appears to be consensus
hat remittances promote development (see for example Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Yang, 2006, 2008, 2011; Yang and Choi,
007, and the references within), the exact drivers of remittance behavior are still being assessed.
The theoretical and empirical literatures on remittance behavior have posited and tested several hypotheses with regard
o migrants’ motives to remit, including altruism (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002), repayment of invest-
ent (for example in education, Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Faini, 2007), provision of insurance against shocks (de la Brière
t al., 2002; Yang and Choi, 2007) and other forms of self interest driven by a search for bequests or esteem if returning home
Hoddinott, 1994; de la Brière et al., 2002; Yang, 2008). Recently, Ashraf et al. (2011), Chin et al. (2011) and Yang (2011) have
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 404 270 6055; fax: +1 404 270 6049.
E-mail addresses: m.torero@cgiar.org (M.  Torero), aviceisz@spelman.edu (A. Viceisza).
1 Tel.: +1 202 862 5662; fax: +1 202 467 4439.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.012
167-2681/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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indicated that the migrant’s ability to control the use of remitted funds can also be seen as an important driver of remittance
decision making.
In this paper we study two related questions: Does full (relative to no) control over remittance spending affect the amount
remitted from a ﬁxed budget and does this effect vary with the size of the budget? We conduct a remittance ﬁeld experi-
ment among Salvadoran migrants in the metropolitan DC area. We maintain a (2 × 2) experimental design in which the
migrant’s budget available for remittances has a value of $400 (high stakes) or $200 (low stakes) and the remitted funds
arrive as grocery vouchers or cash. The grocery vouchers are by name of the remittance recipient, non-transferrable and
only usable for basic necessities that do not include alcohol and cigarettes. Thus, they give the migrant full control over how
the remitted funds are spent, but in only one dimension, groceries. In our experiment, a migrant is randomly allocated to
one of the following four treatments: treatment 1, ($400,groceries); treatment 2, ($200,groceries); treatment 3, ($400,cash);
and treatment 4, ($200,cash). This enables us to test across treatments 1 and 3 (2 and 4) whether full control over remit-
tance spending on groceries, speciﬁcally, the migrant’s ability to control spending on alcohol or cigarettes,  affects the amount
remitted.
The ex ante rationale for controlling remittance spending through basic necessities partly stems from evidence suggested
by other data which show that migrants have a preference for spending on ‘meaningful’ items. For example, a survey
conducted in 2008 and 2009 on behalf of the Government of El Salvador by IFPRI and FUSADES for evaluating the program
Comunidades Solidarias Rurales suggests that migrants desire close to 75% of the remittance budget to be spent on household
expenses (de Brauw, 2011).2 The rationale for excluding alcohol and cigarettes from the coverage of the grocery vouchers is
based on anecdotal evidence that migrants dislike remittances being put to unproductive uses, most notably, to purchase sin
goods such as alcohol and cigarettes. This seems to be a broader concern in the household expenditure literature particularly
when the person spending the money is male, as reported by for example Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) for the Ivory
Coast, Ashraf (2009) (and the references within) for the Philippines, and International Organization for Migration (2010) for
Moldova.
Our quantitative ﬁndings suggest that migrants prefer a remittance to arrive as cash than as groceries when stakes are
high ($400), but not when they are low ($200). This result is robust to inclusion of a wide set of covariates (such as the
migrant’s and the recipient’s gender as well as the migrant’s risk, time, and social preferences) and is consistent with a
conceptual framework in which migrants have preferences over how recipients spend remittances.
Our qualitative ﬁndings suggest that migrants integrate amounts sent in the experiment with the external environment
for sending remittances. Approximately 80% of migrants report that they base the amount sent in the experiment on their
own ﬁnancial need (relative to the recipient’s) and their typical cycle for sending remittances.
When controlling for migrants’ qualitative reasons in the quantitative assessment, we  ﬁnd that migrants have an even
greater preference for cash (over groceries) at high stakes. We  explore the mechanisms underlying this effect and ﬁnd that
migrants who more recently sent a remittance and, in certain speciﬁcations, male migrants exhibit a greater preference for
cash. The former ﬁnding in particular is consistent with a framework in which migrants consider spending on groceries to
be a basic necessity that should have priority over other types of spending.
Overall, two potential implications emerge from our results. First, it is important to be able to assess how subjects inte-
grate decisions within an experiment with decisions in the naturally-occurring environment. Second, remittance products
should give recipients sufﬁcient spending ﬂexibility. While control over spending may  be desirable as suggested by previ-
ous literature (and possibly by the null effect at low stakes), migrants have a preference for cash at high stakes. As such,
experimentation with remittance products that offer controlled liquidity may  be a useful avenue for future research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the hypotheses, experimental design, and empirical
strategy. Section 3 discusses the study implementation. Section 4 presents the main ﬁndings. Finally, Section 5 concludes
and discusses some policy implications.
2. The experiments
Our experiments are designed to study two  related questions: Does full control over remittance spending on groceries
(relative to no control) affect the amount remitted from a ﬁxed budget and does this effect vary with the size of the budget? An
alternative way to frame the ﬁrst question in our setup is to ask whether the migrant’s ability to control spending on goods and
services other than groceries, in particular “sin goods” such as alcohol and cigarettes, affects the amount remitted.
The rationale for these questions comes from an existing literature on intra-household allocations and spending (see for
example Thomas, 1990, 1994; Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Udry, 1996, and the references within) that has speciﬁc applications
in remittance contexts (see for example Lucas and Stark, 1985; de Laat, 2008; Yang, 2011, and the references within). The
literature suggests that different actors within a household may  have different preferences over household spending. In
particular, in a migration context such as ours disagreements may  arise between the migrant and the recipient regarding
how remittances should be spent. As a result, the migrant’s ability to control such spending may  affect the amount remitted
(see for example Ashraf et al., 2011).
2 The other spending categories are education, health, business, construction, and any expense. The survey was not representative at the national level,
but  was  mainly focused on rural areas in El Salvador.
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Table  1
(2x2) Experimental design
Remittance use
Groceries Cash
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wBudget size High: $400 1: ($400,groceries) 3: ($400,cash)
Low: $200 2: ($200,groceries) 4: ($200,cash)
.1. Hypotheses and treatments
The economics literature has posited several models to explain the determinants of migrants’ remittance decisions.
ucas and Stark (1985) present a model of tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest in which the migrant exhibits
nterdependent preferences and remittances are one element in a self-enforcing intra-household arrangement between
he migrant and the recipient. Most models of remittance behavior go back to this rationale, viewing the migrant and the
ecipient as playing a (repeated) sequential game in which the household invests in the migrant in an attempt to spread
isks across space and time. Remittances have thus been argued to be a form of insurance coverage or return on investment,
part from being driven by purely altruistic motives.
Appendix D formalizes a framework that leads to the following hypotheses:
1. Holding the budget size constant, the amount remitted can be different across spending on groceries (i.e. the grocery
reatment) and spending on any goods (i.e. the cash treatment). The sign of this effect will depend on the migrant’s perception
f the recipient’s level of spending on sin goods relative to all other spending, including groceries. If a migrant is willing to
isk the recipient spending the remittance on sin goods, in order for her to have ﬂexibility to buy items such as groceries,
edicine, and clothing, she will send more in the cash treatment. On the other hand, if a migrant is concerned that the cash
emittance will be spent on sin goods, she will send more in the grocery treatment.
2. This effect can vary with the budget size. If the migrant perceives the high-stakes environment as more likely to give
ise to overspending on groceries (sin goods) relative to all other items, she will remit less in the grocery (cash) treatment.
Consistent with the aforementioned hypotheses, we  varied two  aspects across our experiment treatments: (1) the type of
emittance use (across groceries and cash) and (2) the size of the budget available for remittances (across $400 and $200). This
ed to a (2 × 2) design comprising four treatments (see Table 1): treatment 1, ($400,groceries); treatment 2, ($200,groceries);
reatment 3, ($400,cash); and treatment 4, ($200,cash). We  maintained a between-subjects design in which a given migrant
as randomly allocated to one of these four treatments. The main details regarding the implementation of the treatments
re discussed in Section 3.3. Here, we brieﬂy discuss the rationale for the treatments.
In the cash treatments, the amount remitted arrived as cash. In the grocery treatments, the amount remitted arrived as
rocery vouchers that were (1) in name of the remittance recipient, (2) non-transferrable and (3) not redeemable for alcohol
r cigarettes. So, a comparison across the cash and grocery treatments enables a test of H1 (more below).3 The grocery
ouchers were for the supermarket chain ‘Super Selectos’ which according to a report by El Economista (August-September
011) is the most widely preferred chain in El Salvador with a consumer preference rate of 60.6% (followed by La Despensa
amiliar, La Despensa de Don Juan and Walmart at 17.9%, 11.9% and 3% respectively).4
The budget size (i.e. $400 or $200) was the maximum amount the migrant could remit within the experiment. Consistent
ith the conceptual framework, we wanted a high-stakes treatment that could potentially be beyond the satiation point.
he American Community Survey (2008) suggested that Salvadoran migrants’ monthly remittance amount was  on average
288.18. So, we calibrated the low-stakes treatment ($200) at a slightly lower level and the high-stakes treatment ($400) at
 higher level. These high stakes were also consistent with pre-experiment listing data which suggested that only 5% of our
ample typically remitted above $400.
.2. Empirical strategyGiven random treatment assignment, we primarily test H1 by running two types of regression equations:
3 While funds are fungible (in the sense that money not spent on groceries can be spent on other items), we  note that ceteris paribus the grocery treatment
ave  the migrant better information how remittances would be spent, as one component of spending was  more observable relative to the counterfactual
ash  treatment.
4 Fig. 1 indicates the distribution of Super Selectos subsidiaries across Salvadoran municipalities at the time of our study. Fig. 2 overlays this distribution
ith  that of the municipalities represented in our sample of remittance recipients. Section 3.1 will discuss how we arrived at this sample. As Section 4 will
iscuss, it is unlikely that our ﬁndings are driven by a lack of preference for grocery vouchers from Super Selectos. We ﬁnd that migrants exhibit a strict
reference for cash at high stakes, but not at low stakes. Such an effect is unlikely to be driven by an overall lack of preference for Super Selectos, since we
ould  expect this to manifest itself uniformly across stakes.
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• A basic speciﬁcationyi = ˇ0 + −jˇD−j D−j + i, (1)
where yi is the amount remitted by migrant i (this is our dependent variable “sent amount”); ˇ0 is a constant; D−j is a
collection of treatment dummies excluding treatment j, which is taken as the baseline; and i is an error term. At a budget
size of $400, j = 1 such that treatment 1 (the $400 grocery treatment) is omitted. Thus, we  are interested in the signof ˇD3 ,
Fig. 2. Municipios (municipalities) with Super Selectos supermarkets and sample of recipients.
M.  Torero, A. Viceisza / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) 221–236 225
Table  2
Means-comparisons of pre-treatment characteristics by samplea,b
N migrant gender age** recipient gender remittance income primary school
Universe 550 0.371 36.493 0.810 267.727 1319.618 0.867
Conﬁrmed 324 0.354 36.525 0.801 270.367 1326.491 0.860
Showed-up 133 0.391 38.797 0.782 278.316 1320.451 0.879
Surveyed 122 0.385 39.123 0.779 280.115 1316.148 0.884
ACS  2008 700,000 0.472 39.187 – 288.179 1838.583 –
a
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*
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iBased on F-tests for equality of means performed across all samples excluding the ACS sample.
All variables as deﬁned in Table 3.
* Age is signiﬁcantly different at the 5% level; no other variables are signiﬁcantly different.
the coefﬁcient associated with treatment 3 (the $400 cash treatment). At a budget size of $200, j = 2 such that treatment 2
(the $200 grocery treatment) is omitted. We  are interested in the sign of ˇD4 , the coefﬁcient associated with treatment 4
(the $200 cash treatment).
An augmented speciﬁcation
yi = ˇ0 + −jˇD−j D−j + kˇXki Xki + −jkˇD−jXki D−jXki + i, (2)
where Xki represents a set of k proxies/covariates (we elaborate on these when discussing the data), D−jXki is a collection of
interaction terms between the treatment dummies and the set of proxies, and all else is as deﬁned previously. At a budget
size of $400, treatment 1 is omitted and we are interested in the sign of ˇD3Xk , which indicates whether the main treatment
effect varies with the relevant set of proxies. At a budget size of $200, treatment 2 is omitted and we  are interested in the
sign of ˇD4Xk .
A simple ‘test’ of H2 is obtained by comparing the main coefﬁcients from regression Eqs. (1) and (2) across stakes.
. Study implementation
It is estimated that approximately one out of seven to ﬁve Salvadorans live in the US and that they contribute anywhere
rom 8.59% to 16.94% of El Salvador’s GDP annually in remittances (Terrazas, 2010; US Census, 2008; Central Intelligence
gency, 2010; Ratha et al., 2009). Therefore, the population of Salvadoran migrants in the US has been an ideal group for
tudying remittance behavior (some examples in the economics literature include Funkhouser, 1995; Edwards and Ureta,
003; Ashraf et al., 2011).
A substantial proportion of the Salvadoran-Born population in the United States is concentrated in the Washington DC-
aryland-Virginia Metropolitan Statistical Area (US Census, 2008; Terrazas, 2010). Therefore, we selected the Salvadoran-
orn population of the metropolitan DC area as our primary group of interest.
In what follows, we discuss (1) the sample; (2) the recruitment and listing of potential participants; (3) the experiment
rotocol; and (4) the implementation of the experiment sessions.
.1. The sample
Our aim was to have a ﬁnal sample of 200 migrants across the four treatments (i.e. 50 migrants per treatment). With an
nticipated attrition rate of 50%, we aimed for a sample of 400 conﬁrmed migrants. The recruitment steps discussed in the
ext section were geared towards having a list of at least 600 potentially participating migrants. 610 migrants were listed of
hom 550 met  the eligibility criteria for the study. 324 migrants conﬁrmed their willingness to participate and were invited
o attend a randomly assigned treatment (81 for treatment 1, 84 for treatment 2, 83 for treatment 3 and 76 for treatment
).5 Eventually, 133 migrants showed up for the experiments: 38 for treatment 1, 37 for treatment 2, 27 for treatment 3 and
1 for treatment 4.
Table 2 compares the means of these basic characteristics across the different stages of sampling. The showed-up
ample is not statistically different from the universe. An F-test for equality of means suggests that the samples are
nly different with regard to age at the 5% level. The table also includes averages for a nationally representative sample
f Salvadorans across the US according to the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS, US Census, 2008). Our sam-
le seems to be poorer and sending lower remittances than the nationally representative sample (these statements
re not based on statistical tests), but this is not necessarily surprising given our sample mainly comprises blue collar
igrants.
5 We also contacted the conﬁrmed participants a second time (one day before the study). During both calls, participants were informed or reminded of
he  date, time and place of the study. They were asked to arrive 30 min prior to the beginning of the session and were informed that swapping sessions
as  not a possibility. All participants were reminded that, if they got to participate in the study, they would be paid a ﬁxed amount of $40 and that there
ould  be the possibility to win an additional prize. They were asked to bring picture identiﬁcation as well as a sheet of paper with the name and contact
nformation of the primary remittance recipient in El Salvador.
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Table 3
Means-comparisons of pre-treatment characteristics by treatmenta
Sample 1: ($400,groc) 2: ($200,groc) 3: ($400,cash) 4: ($200,cash) 12 34 13 24
migrant gender Conﬁrmed 0.395b 0.415 0.277 0.329 -0.020d -0.052 0.118 0.086
(1=female) (0.492)c (0.496) (0.450) (0.473) (0.077) (0.073) (0.074) (0.077)
Showed-up 0.553 0.486 0.185 0.258 0.066 -0.073 0.367*** 0.228
(0.504) (0.507) (0.396) (0.445) (0.117) (0.111) (0.116) (0.117)
age  Conﬁrmed 35.432 35.671 36.928 38.171 -0.239 -1.243 -1.496 -2.500
(in  years) (10.257) (9.340) (10.220) (11.332) (1.536) (1.709) (1.599) (1.647)
Showed-up 38.079 37.541 37.741 42.097 0.538 -4.356 0.338 -4.556
(11.849) (10.897) (11.040) (11.542) (2.631) (2.978) (2.900) (2.726)
recipient gender Conﬁrmed 0.802 0.756 0.843 0.803 0.046 0.041 -0.041 -0.047
(1=female) (0.401) (0.432) (0.366) (0.401) (0.065) (0.061) (0.060) (0.066)
Showed-up 0.763 0.676 0.889 0.839 0.087 0.050 -0.126 -0.163
(0.431) (0.475) (0.320) (0.374) (0.105) (0.092) (0.098) (0.105)
monthly remittancee Conﬁrmed 256.765 269.500 280.060 275.211 -12.735 4.850 -23.295 -5.711
(in  US$) (150.340) (179.088) (157.508) (377.869) (25.915) (45.232) (24.054) (46.504)
Showed-up 266.184 295.757 282.407 268.807 -29.573 13.601 -16.223 26.950
(166.138) (222.265) (137.850) (201.795) (45.231) (46.076) (39.036) (51.912)
monthly income Conﬁrmed 1357.037 1285.244 1401.446 1256.579 71.793 144.867 -44.409 28.665
(in  US$) (570.941) (605.127) (798.206) (676.823) (92.174) (117.914) (108.599) (102.000)
Showed-up 1307.105 1352.703 1394.444 1233.871 -45.598 160.573 -87.339 118.832
(634.737) (663.947) (749.786) (592.085) (149.964) (176.354) (172.305) (153.955)
primary school Conﬁrmed 0.877 0.805 0.855 0.934 0.072 -0.079 0.021 -0.129**
(1=completed) (0.331) (0.399) (0.354) (0.377) (0.057) (0.058) (0.054) (0.062)
Showed-up 0.842 0.838 0.926 1.000 0.004 -0.074 -0.084 -0.162
(0.370) (0.374) (0.267) (0.447) (0.086) (0.099) (0.083) (0.100)
a Based on t-tests for equality of means performed on pairwise treatments for each sample.
b mean for given treatment group, c standard error in parenthesis. d ij represents the difference in means for treatment group i and j (i.e., meani-meanj).
e Also tested but not included is the remittance frequency. The variable is not signiﬁcant in any comparison.
***  p<0.01, ** p<0.05. Only differences that are signiﬁcant at the 5% level (and below) are reported.
Table 3 shows that there are no statistical differences in the means of basic characteristics collected at baseline (i.e. prior
to the experiments) across treatments for the sample of migrants who conﬁrmed and showed up at the experiments.6 One
exception is that signiﬁcantly more women showed up for treatment 1 than for treatment 3. To minimize potential bias, we
control for gender when comparing treatments 1 and 3.
Finally, we map  the municipalities (municipios) of the Salvadoran recipients represented in our sample across El Salvador.
Fig. 3 indicates that the Salvadoran recipients are quite spread out across El Salvador.
3.2. Listing
To gather the universe of Salvadorans in the metro DC area, we  took several steps:
1 We  hired three experienced recruiters who were trained extensively on (1) the importance of the study and how to pitch
the study to potential participants (speciﬁcally, they were instructed how to explain the study without revealing too much
information about its main question) and (2) the importance of respecting randomized treatment groups (i.e. to maintain
the integrity of the study and achieve proper identiﬁcation). The recruiters were given IFPRI cellular phones to facilitate
communication and IFPRI IDs and CASA de Maryland attire to exude more conﬁdence.7
2 We  reached agreements with several venues frequented by Salvadorans in the metro DC area (i.e., DC, Maryland and
Virginia) in order to recruit on their premises. The main venues were (1) CASA de Maryland’s three main workers’ centers
(Prince George, Wheaton and Langley Park), (2) the Salvadoran Embassy in DC, (3) CARECEN in DC and (4) Clínica del
Pueblo in DC. All of these venues are known to cater to Central Americans in general and Salvadorans in particular. For
a period of approximately four weeks, the recruiters visited these locations daily to recruit potential participants for the
study. The typical ﬂyer they used to recruit participants is indicated in Fig. A.7. Flyers were also left at the recruitment
venues. In particular, CASA de Maryland posted the ﬂyers on the doors of their main entrances. As indicated on the ﬂyer,
the criteria for participation in the study were (1) being Salvadoran, (2) being of a certain age (particularly, being 18 or
older), (3) being able to read and write (i.e. having completed primary school), (4) typically sending remittances and (5)
having some type of job (this did not have to be a full-time job).
6 Additional checks, in particular based on additional characteristics collected at endline, are available from the authors upon request.
7 CASA de Maryland is an NGO that was founded in 1985. It has a longstanding tradition of advocating for both migrant rights. It was created in response
to  the human needs of Central Americans arriving to the DC area after ﬂeeing civil complexities in their home countries and thus, it is considered a “safe
haven” for migrants. Our collaboration with CASA extended beyond just recruitment as will be discussed below; we also conducted the experiments at one
of  their locations.
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(Fig. 3. Municipios (municipalities) with sample of recipients.
When migrants signed up for the study, they or the recruiter completed a form that contained the following information:
name and contact information (i.e., phone, email and address), age, level of education, average monthly income, typical
amount remitted, frequency and name of typical remittance recipient in El Salvador. This information served as a way
to determine whether a migrant qualiﬁed as a potential participant. Furthermore, it would also enable us to assess any
attrition bias.
 Finally, one of the experimenters also made an appearance on Radio Zol, which is a popular radio station among Latinos
(in particular, Salvadorans) in the metro DC area. During the broadcast, the study was explained and contact information
was provided.
As previously mentioned, these efforts led to a total of 610 potentially participating migrants of whom 550 met all
equirements for the study.
.3. Experiment protocol
A main aim underlying our protocol was to reduce any distrust that might exist towards the remittance institution created
s part of our experiment. While the budget available for remittances was provided by the experimenters and there were no
ees associated with funds sent, ex ante we were still concerned that migrants may  distrust the environment. In this section,
e discuss in detail how we reduced this concern. Since all treatments were operationalized in the same manner, we ﬁrst
escribe the basic premise of treatment 1 (the $400 grocery treatment). Then, we brieﬂy discuss how the other treatments
iffered.
The migrant had to make a choice how much to remit from a budget of $400.8 To facilitate the practical implementation
f the experiment (in particular, payment), the migrant was restricted to remitting in increments of $50.9 The migrant used
he form in Fig. A.1 to decide how much to remit. The amount remitted would be paid in grocery vouchers to an indicated
ecipient in El Salvador no more than three days later. The amount the migrant decided to keep was  paid at the end of the
xperiment (i.e., the same day) in the form of VISA gift cards. While these gift cards fulﬁlled the same purpose as cash in
8 The remittance budget was  provided by the experiments. As such, a migrant may  view this budget as “windfall” and experience a so-called “house-
oney effect” (see for example Thaler and Johnson, 1990). We  believe this is unlikely to confound our main treatment effects since (1) the experiments are
onducted between subjects and (2) effects are identiﬁed across treatments of the same budget size. To the extent that migrants do experience windfall,
e  hypothesize that this effect would drive migrants to split the pie equally–that is, conform to the 50–50 norm–across the board. This effect would lead
o  an underestimate of the treatment effect.
9 It is common to have discrete choice sets in lab-like ﬁeld experiments of this type. The $50 increment was  chosen to give enough variation in choices
hile still facilitating the implementation. Yang (2011) discusses that common remittance amounts for a sample of Salvadorans in the metro DC area are
100,  $150, $200 and $300. So, a ‘forced’ choice set with increments of $50 seems reasonable given these migrants typical reality. Using the pre-experiment
recruitment) phase data, we ﬁnd a similar pattern for the sample that showed up for our experiments (N=133); typical remittance amounts are $100
24.81%), $150 (11.28%), $200 (25.56%), $250 (5.26%), $300 (12.78%), $350 (1.50%), $400 (4.51%), and $500 (4.51%).
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that they could be used at any establishment that accepts VISA, they made it practically impossible for migrants to divert
cash outside of the experiments since they could not be returned or exchanged. As previously discussed, we wanted to
mitigate this as much as possible, as it would undermine the purpose of the experiments, which was  to elicit migrants’ ‘true’
preferences for remittances. Payment through VISA cards did not fully eliminate the possibility for migrants to keep funds
and purchase physical goods to be remitted outside the experiment. To get a sense of this, we asked migrants to explain the
choices they made within the experiment immediately after making their decisions. Fig. A.2 contains the exact framing of
the question. A categorized version of the responses suggests that only 1.5% of migrants explicitly indicated that they were
keeping funds for this purpose. We elaborate on these responses in Section 4.1.
The following measures were also taken:
1. The experiments were conducted at a location that was  familiar and trusted by the migrants, particularly, those who might
be illegal. We  formed an alliance with CASA de Maryland to conduct the experiments at their Prince George’s Workers’
Center. This went hand-in-hand with recruiting participants at their locations as discussed previously.
2. CASA representatives were involved as much as possible in the implementation of the experiments. One of the main ways
in which we did this was to have the manager of CASA’s Prince George’s Workers’ Center hold a speech at the beginning
of each treatment explaining primarily (1) what could be expected in the session and (2) that the experimenters were
trustworthy partners of CASA. The speech, which was  read aloud at the beginning of each session, is contained in Fig. A.3.
3. We  gave a detailed explanation of (1) the decision the migrant faced (i.e. the choice set), (2) her potential earnings and
those of the recipient and (3) how we would ensure that the remittance made it to the recipient.10 This included a concise
yet informative presentation of UNIMER Research International in El Salvador, the partner assisting us in delivering the
remittances. An important component of this explanation was a pre-recorded video by a representative of UNIMER, which
basically explained UNIMER’s role in delivering the remittances to the recipients. The video also gave detailed information
on the ﬁrm’s contact information in El Salvador (i.e., address, telephone, email, and website) such that the migrant and/or
the recipient could contact them as necessary. The video was  shown prior to the migrants’ decision making. The basic
components of the UNIMER presentation and the text for the video are contained in Fig. A.4.11
4. Contrary to typical remittance carriers, migrants did not have to pay a fee for sending this remittance. This cost was born
by the experimenters.
5. Each migrant who participated in the experiment received a phone card that would allow them to make a 10 min  call to
El Salvador. Migrants could use this phone card to call the recipient in El Salvador to conﬁrm whether the remittance had
arrived. The experimenter handed out the phone cards prior to decision making to give a clear signal that migrants would
be able to follow up on the remittance.
6. The migrant would be provided with a picture of the recipient in El Salvador as she received the remittance. UNIMER was
instructed to take pictures of all recipients and send them to the experimenters. In turn, physical prints of these pictures
were provided to CASA for pick-up by the migrants after the experiment.
7. Migrants were promised a ﬁxed payment of $40 as compensation for (1) attending the session (i.e. to cover time, trans-
portation etc.) and (2) completing the post-survey. We  paid part of this ($25) upon arrival (i.e. immediately after migrants
had been signed in and registered) to send a signal that decisions and earnings in the experiment would be for real. The
remainder was paid upon completion of the study.
Overall, these measures seem to have worked. 85.71% of migrants chose to send an amount greater than zero. Further-
more, responses to the open-ended question that followed the decision-making phase of the experiments suggest that
migrants trusted the institution. For example, some migrants reported that they were sending lower (higher) amounts
because of recent remittance sending (or lack thereof), which suggests that they saw our institution as an alternative avenue
for remittance sending.
The other treatments followed the same protocol as treatment 1, except for the difference in remittance use and/or budget
size. The remittance form for treatment 3 (the $400 cash treatment) is displayed in Fig. A.5. Similarly to the $400 treatments,
the $200 treatments also required migrants to remit in increments of $50. So, the forms for the low-stakes treatments had
a smaller set of alternatives. The forms are not included, but are available from the authors upon request.
Finally, since the budget sizes were calibrated around typical remittance amounts, budget limitations made it infeasible
to have all migrant decisions become binding. So, we incorporated a lottery procedure into the payment protocol. In any
given treatment, ten migrants would win the lottery and thus, have their earnings and those of their recipient become
binding.12 The exact procedures for the lottery implementation are discussed in the next section.
10 The complete protocol is available from the authors upon request.
11 The electronic ﬁle of the video can be obtained from the authors upon request.
12 Since the number of lottery winners was ﬁxed a priori at ten per treatment, as we were aiming for 50 participants per treatment, the probability
of  winning the lottery ended up varying across treatments. So, it could be argued that subjects who were in treatments that had a higher probability of
winning were more likely to reveal their preferences for remittance sending. We believe this is of lesser concern since previous studies such as Laury
(2006)  have found that “lottery” and “pay-for-all” payment procedures elicit similar decisions. Furthermore, participants were urged several times prior
to  decisionmaking to take the decision seriously. To some extent, this was without reason since casual observation suggested that participants took
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.4. Experiment sessions
All experiments were conducted at CASA de Maryland’s Prince George’s Workers’ Center. All treatments were conducted
he same day to mitigate spill-overs. Each experiment treatment was randomly allocated to a time slot (session) during that
ay and participants who were randomly allocated to that treatment were invited for that speciﬁc session.13 Participants
new that they were invited for a speciﬁc session, but did not know the details of that or other sessions such as the type of
reatment.
The procedures for each session were as follows. Upon arrival, the identity of each participant was  veriﬁed by matching
he list of invitees for that session and their identiﬁcation (either CASA ID, passport or driver’s license). This was  done outside
n front of the main entrance to CASA’s premises. Once veriﬁed, the participant was assigned a number and given access to
ASA’s premises.
The map  to CASA’s premises is displayed in Fig. A.6. It will assist in describing the different stages of each session and how
e mitigated the possibility for participants to interact across treatments. Upon entry to CASA’s premises, participants lined
p in the corridor, as indicated by the arrow starting at point 0 in the ﬁgure. Each participant entered room 1 individually to
omplete the sign-in process. She showed the number that was  assigned to her upon arrival to verify that she had passed the
nitial checkpoint. Then, she was asked for her ID again to conﬁrm her identity. At that point she was assigned a unique study
D which would be used throughout the study to identify herself (as opposed to her name). This study ID was known only
o her and was conﬁdential towards other participants. The participant was then asked to provide the contact information
i.e., name, address, phone, email) of her respective remittance recipient in El Salvador (recall that participants were asked
o bring this information when they were invited for the study). The participant then drew a number from an opaque bag.
his number, which ranged from 1 to 50, was her seat number. After drawing the seat number, she was  paid the $25 to partly
ompensate for attendance (recall the discussion in the previous section). She then entered room 2 and awaited additional
nstructions.
Room 2 was the main decision-making room. Upon entering room 2, the participant was  instructed to ﬁnd her seat number
nd locate herself at that station. She was then explained the consent form, which she had to sign using her ID number to
e able to participate in the experiment. Once all participants had signed the consent form, the session started. The CASA
epresentative would hold his speech (recall Fig. A.3) and then the main experimenter, who was held ﬁxed throughout all
reatments, would explain the task at hand.
As mentioned previously, a complete set of protocols and instructions are available from the authors upon request, but
rieﬂy the procedure in room 2 consisted of: (1) an explanation of the remittance decision and of the lottery procedure for
he decision becoming binding, (2) the presentation of UNIMER which included the video by the UNIMER representative, (3)
istribution of the phone cards, (4) recording of the remittance decision, i.e., how much the migrant wanted to send (recall
he record forms in Figs. A.1 and A.5) and (5) responding to the open-ended question which asked for the migrant’s rationale
or decision making.
Privacy of participants’ decisions elicited in room 2 was an important component of our protocol, as we  wanted to
itigate three types of “audience/social effects”: (1) subject peer effects, (2) experimenter scrutiny effects and (3) recipient
crutiny effects. To mitigate issues associated with (1), participants were assigned IDs that were conﬁdential towards other
articipants and participants made their decisions behind large voting boxes (comparable to dividers typically used in
xperimental laboratories). Also, when announcing the lottery winners (see the discussion related to room 5 below), these
ere announced using subjects’ ID numbers.
To mitigate issues associated with (2), the experimenter retreated to a corner of the room and faced away from the par-
icipants while decisions were being made. Typically, the experimenter was  the only person in room 2 with some exception
eing made in case some participants needed assistance completing the remittance form. Furthermore, subjects submitted
heir remittance record forms in closed envelopes that were marked with their seat numbers. These envelopes were col-
ected by the experimenter and passed to assistant experimenters in room 3 (room 4 was  used to keep extra supplies for the
xperiment such as additional forms). So, the main experimenter could not observe the decisions made in the session while
t was in progress. To assure that migrants were correctly recording decisions, the assistant experimenters were in charge of
1) opening all envelopes, (2) verifying that the participant ID on the record form matched the seat number according to the
ign-in sheet constructed in room 1 and (3) registering the decisions. Any mistakes were reported to the main experimenter
ho was in charge of addressing those with the participants. All windows between room 1 and other rooms where people
ay have been able to observe subjects’ decisions–in particular room 3 and the corridor along point 0–were covered.
Finally, to mitigate issues associated with (3), the migrants were clearly informed that if they chose not to remit and
on the lottery, we would not contact the “recipient” in El Salvador. This was  motivated using parallelism with the external
he decisions quite seriously. This was further strengthened by the fact that the experiments were conducted during the earlier stages of the economic
ownturn.
13 We randomized participants into pre-scheduled treatments/sessions as opposed to doing so upon arrival, since the latter would have complicated the
mplementation considerably. Namely, it would have required us to either have participants from different treatments in the same session and thus increase
he  probability of spill-overs across treatments or run simultaneous sessions and thus have multiple experimenters in different rooms. An alternative would
ave  been to have participants choose how the remittance arrived (i.e. groceries versus cash) in addition to what was already being chosen. However, we
anted to ensure that a sufﬁcient number of participants were faced with different treatment conditions (i.e. groceries versus cash).
230 M.  Torero, A. Viceisza / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) 221–236
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 100 200 300 400
sent_amount
c.d.f. of  1 c.d.f. of  3 
1: ($400,groceries), 3: ($400,cash)Fig. 4. Distributions of amount sent (groceries and cash at $400).
environment: On days when the migrant did not send a remittance, there was no reason for the recipient to go to the local
branch of the remittance company or for the remittance company to contact the recipient. This was done to avoid that
migrants felt obligated to remit (a type of “audience effect” explored by Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009, among others). It
could very well be that this type of audience effect was  minimal in our experimental context. This was  likely to be the case if
migrants considered the remittance decision within the experiment to be part of their day-to-day remittance cycle external
to the experiment. While ex post evidence suggests that this was  the case, when designing the experiment it was  uncertain
whether migrants would perceive the decision-making environment as such.
Once the participants completed the process in room 2 they proceeded to room 5. In room 5 they completed three
tasks: (1) the post-survey, (2) the lottery and (3) the ﬁnal payment. Those participants who  were unable to complete the
post-survey the same day were surveyed by one of the recruiters within one to two weeks after the experiment.14
The lottery was announced publicly using participants’ conﬁdential ID numbers to show that people from the session
had actually won the lottery. The lottery was not announced by name to maintain privacy. Once the lottery was announced,
participants were paid for their decisions. Participants received large thick envelopes that made it difﬁcult to detect the
envelopes’ contents. This was done to protect the privacy of the lottery winners whose envelopes were more likely to be
fuller due to the VISA cards. All participants were also paid the remaining payment for showing up ($15). Subjects were
then free to leave. They were instructed to vacate the premises in order not to disturb the next session, which was already
in room 1.
Each session lasted on average 150 min. All participants were paid a ﬁxed amount of $40 as payment for showing up and
participating. In addition, the 40 participants who won the lottery were also paid according to how much they had decided
to keep. This amount was paid by means of VISA gift cards. On average those payments amounted to $148.75. So, overall,
average payoffs were $84.74. This compares to an average daily income of $34.66 for the sample under consideration.
4. Results
To get a sense of migrants’ sending behavior across groceries versus cash, we  start with some basic statistics, tests,
and graphs. On average migrants send $ 186.84 in the high-stakes grocery treatment and $ 222.22 in the high-stakes cash
treatment. These amounts are signiﬁcantly different at the 10% level based on a one-sided t-test. At low stakes, migrants
send an average of $ 78.38 in the grocery treatment and $ 100 in the cash treatment. This difference is also signiﬁcant at the
10% level based on a one-sided t-test. However, these are unconditional tests that do not control for observable differences
across the treatments, as noted in Section 3.1 (more in Section 4.2 below).
Fig. 4 shows the empirical distribution functions of groceries and cash at high stakes. It appears that the distribution
of cash ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of groceries. This suggests that overall (as well as on average)
14 11 participants did not complete the post-survey.
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igrants send higher amounts in the cash treatment. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov full distribution test, however, cannot reject
he null that these distributions are the same (p-value of 0.65).
Fig. 5 shows the empirical distribution functions of groceries and cash at low stakes. It appears that the distribution of
roceries second-order stochastically dominates the distribution of cash. This suggests that on average migrants send similar
mounts across these treatments, but that there is greater variability in the amount sent when it arrives as grocery vouchers.
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov full distribution test rejects the null that these distributions are the same (p-value 0.097).
.1. Qualitative insights
In order to gain a better understanding of migrants’ decisions in the experiment, we asked them (after they had decided
hether to send funds and the associated amount) to explain their reasoning. A.2 contains the exact framing of the question.
s ﬁrst explained in Section 3.3, this was an open-ended question that migrants could answer however they wanted.15
In order to incorporate these responses into the analysis, we  categorized them based on keywords and common rationales
a full report is available from the authors upon request). The ﬁrst three categories are migrants who base the amount sent on
heir ﬁnancial need relative to the recipient’s. Category 1 comprises migrants who have less ﬁnancial need than the recipient;
ategory 2 comprises migrants who have the same ﬁnancial need as the recipient; and category 3 comprises migrants who  have
reater ﬁnancial need than the recipient. Category 4 comprises migrants who  explicitly indicate a preference for remittances
eing spent on groceries. Category 5 comprises migrants who  explicitly indicate a preference for remittances being spent
n other items such as school fees, clothing, and medicine. Category 6 comprises migrants who  explicitly cite their external
emittance cycle, for example “I am sending this amount because I have not sent money in a while”. Category 7 comprises
igrants who perceive the experiment as a service being provided by a new remittance carrier. Category 8 comprises
igrants who explicitly indicate that they are repaying the recipient. Category 9 comprises migrants who are concerned
hat the recipient resides far from a Superselectos branch. Finally, Category 10 comprises migrants who  have other reasons
or the amounts sent.
Table 4 shows the distribution of categorized responses overall and by treatment. To conﬁrm that these responses actually
ationalize migrants’ decisions in the experiment, we perform some checks. First, Category 4 is most likely to be reported in
ne of the grocery treatments since migrants in the cash treatments were not exposed to this option (recall the between-
ubject nature of our design). Indeed, the only cases where migrants indicate a preference for remittance spending on
roceries are in treatment 1 – the $400 grocery treatment. Second, Category 9 should only be reported in one of the grocery
reatments, since in the cash treatment the funds can be spent anywhere. Indeed, the only case is in treatment 2 – the $200
rocery treatment. Third, the only cases of Category 5, where migrants indicate a preference for spending on other items
such as school fees, clothing, and medicine) in addition to groceries, occur in treatments 1 and 2 – the grocery treatments.
15 One migrant did not answer this question.
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Table 4
Distribution of reasons for amount remitted†
Category Overall 1: ($400,groc) 2: ($200,groc) 3: ($400,cash) 4: ($200,cash)
1. Migrant has less need 50/132 13 10 12 15
2.  Migrant has same need 19/132 9 5 3 2
3.  Migrant has greater need 22/132 3 9 3 7
4.  Spending on groceries 2/132 2 0 0 0
5.  Spending on other items 2/132 1 1 0 0
6.  Remittance cycle 19/132 6 1 7 5
7.  New remittance service 4/132 0 3 1 0
8.  Repaying recipient 1/132 0 0 1 0
9.  No Superselectos branch 1/132 0 1 0 0
10.  Other reasons 12/132 4 6 0 2
†One individual did not respond.
This makes sense, given these migrants are indicating that they like to control spending in more than one dimension – not
just on groceries. Finally, if migrants truly weighed their ﬁnancial need relative to the recipient’s, as indicated by categories
1 through 3, we should observe different distributions of amounts sent across these three categories. In particular, migrants
in category 1 should typically send more than half of the amount available to them (that is, the $400 or $200, depending on
the treatment) to the recipient; migrants in category 2 should split equally; and, migrants in category 3 should send less than
half. This is indeed the case: Of the migrants who  fall in category 1, 80% sent at least 50% to the recipient; of the migrants
who fall in category 2, 84% sent exactly 50% to the recipient; and ﬁnally, all migrants who fall in category 3 sent at most 50%
to the recipient. So, overall the qualitative responses rationalize amounts sent in the experiment.
Having established that, we can now look at the main reasons for decisions made in the experiment. Table 4 shows that
69% of the sample decide how much to send based on their own  ﬁnancial need relative to the recipient’s (categories 1 through
3). Of the remaining, approximately half base the amount sent on their usual remittance cycle, that is, amounts sent outside
of the experiment (category 6). These reports suggest that migrants “integrate” the remittance decision in the experiment
with their day-to-day remittance behavior. Apart from giving external validity to the decisions made in the experiment,
this suggests that we should control for migrants’ responses to the qualitative question when conducting the quantitative
analysis.
In what follows, we  seek to test the main hypotheses discussed in Section 2.2 by primarily estimating regression equa-
tions 1 (Section 4.2) and 2 (Section 4.3). Given the alignment between the qualitative reports and the amounts sent, these
speciﬁcations also control for migrants’ reasons for remitting. To this end, we create dummy  variables for the four most
frequent categories (that is, categories 1, 2, 3, and 6) and include those as controls in the regressions. Finally, since the
amount remitted is bounded below by zero and above by 400 by design of the experiment, our estimations follow a tobit
speciﬁcation (see discussions by de la Brière et al., 2002; Hoddinott, 1992, particularly in the context of remittance sending).
4.2. Quantitative ﬁndings
As discussed in Section 3.1, female migrants were signiﬁcantly less likely to show up for treatment 3 ($400, cash) than
treatment 1 ($400, groceries). In order to control for this observable difference across the two  treatments, we include the
migrant-gender dummy  in all speciﬁcations in Table 5 ($400). For consistent comparison, the speciﬁcations in Table 6 ($200)
also control for the migrant’s gender (the signiﬁcance of the treatment effect is no different if this control is omitted). All
estimations pool the data across all treatments and control for three of the four treatment dummies, taking the omitted one
as the baseline.
Column 1 of Table 5 and column 1 of Table 6 present the main estimates of regression equation 1 at stakes of $400 and
$200 respectively. They suggest that migrants have a statistically signiﬁcant preference for cash at high stakes (at the 10%
level), but not at low stakes.
While these ﬁndings are consistent with the conceptual framework discussed in Appendix D, they do not account for
migrants’ qualitative responses. So, columns 2 through 8 in both tables control for the four main categories of qualitative
responses (1, 2, 3, and 6) given by migrants (recall the dummy  variables discussed in the previous section). Column 2 in
particular shows that including these dummies strengthens the signiﬁcance of the treatment effect at high stakes (Table 5).
Migrants send signiﬁcantly more in the high-stakes cash treatment at the 5% level (as opposed to the previous 10% level),
once we control for their qualitative reasoning. Meanwhile, the effect remains insigniﬁcant at low stakes (compare columns
1 and 2 of Table 6).
Returning to the hypotheses in Section 2.1, the above ﬁndings are consistent with migrants being willing to sacriﬁce
spending on sin goods in order for the recipient to have more ﬂexibility when spending the remitted funds (this is the test
of H1). This effect holds even after controlling for migrants’ qualitative reasonings; in fact, it is stronger. However, the effect
only holds at high stakes ($400). At low stakes, there is no signiﬁcant difference between amounts sent in the grocery and
cash treatments. This suggests that there is an effect of the budget size on migrants’ perceived spending patterns (this is the
test of H2).
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Table  5
Preference for groceries or cash at $400?†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount
cash  400 50.55* 50.37** 127.5** 111.1** 122.1** 156.0*** 159.7*** 152.8***
(27.56) (24.29) (53.73) (55.78) (51.79) (54.12) (60.40) (52.80)
migrant gender (mg) 29.45 26.23 55.63 187.6** 162.4* 228.9** 0.507 148.1*
(19.63) (17.19) (65.73) (91.54) (87.23) (90.88) (63.76) (86.80)
mg  * cash 400 -127.7 -250.6** -215.1** -295.4*** -51.07 -220.0**
(78.60) (100.6) (96.88) (100.7) (77.76) (95.74)
recipient gender (rg) 15.39 -105.9 -73.05 -127.1 92.96* -75.03
(66.22) (92.11) (87.89) (88.91) (55.43) (86.84)
rg  * cash 400 -54.48 82.12 40.63 92.51 -114.4 45.82
(83.33) (109.1) (101.3) (101.9) (73.39) (100.1)
risk  preferencea -3.799
(17.20)
time preferenceb 27.74
(27.13)
trustc -5.249
(13.09)
altruism (1=selﬁsh)d -15.03
(19.32)
repayment motive 64.24
(42.06)
expectations motive 28.07
(16.93)
grocery preference (gp) 67.81*
(35.83)
gp  * cash 400 -74.37
(67.07)
normative spending (ns) -3.955
(34.70)
ns  * cash 400 -57.13
(54.94)
last  remittance (lr) 7.479**
(3.612)
lr  * cash 400 -8.275**
(4.049)
Constant 170.4*** 160.5*** 132.9*** 162.3*** 123.0*** 109.3*** 147.3*** 117.6***
(20.35) (24.68) (28.73) (47.36) (29.89) (33.61) (36.27) (30.97)
‡ 105.0 90.27 86.69 83.70 82.65 82.26 82.39 81.60
(7.660) (6.499) (6.236) (6.218) (6.136) (6.111) (6.220) (6.046)
Observations 133 132 132 122 122 122 119 122
Log  likelihood -674.6 -652.6 -647.8 -600.4 -599.2 -598.7 -581.3 -597.1
Pseudo-R2 0.0320 0.0610 0.0679 0.0702 0.0721 0.0728 0.0745 0.0754
Interactionse N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Qualitativef N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
† Tobit estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ‡ Analogous to the square root of the residual variance in an OLS regression.
Data  pooled across all treatments. Groc 400 is the baseline and cash 400 is the comparison. The other treatment dummies are included in all columns but
not  reported.
a Based on a hypothetical Binswanger (1980) style lottery choice framework. b Based on choices over hypothetical amounts of money today versus in one
month.
c d
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tBased on the frequency with which the migrant lends money when asked. This is based on a hypothetical dichotomous choice dictator game.
Whether interactions between the other treatment dummies and the respective covariates are included. f Whether qualitative dummies are included.
=no,  Y=yes.
.3. Mechanisms and robustness checks
The framework developed in Appendix D suggests that differential behavior across the grocery and cash treatments is
ue to migrants’ preferences for remittance spending. In order to explore this mechanism further and assess whether it
s robust to alternative explanations, we expand the speciﬁcations in columns 1 and 2 of Tables C.5 and C.6 by estimating
quation 2.
One way to proxy for both the migrant’s and the recipient’s preferences for spending is to control for their respective
enders. The use of gender as a proxy for preferences is supported by previous literature, which suggests that (1) there exist
ender differences in preferences and decisionmaking (see for example Croson and Gneezy, 2009) and (2) women  tend to
e associated with higher (child) nutrition in the household (see for example Thomas, 1990, 1994).
Column 3 of both tables shows that including the migrant- and recipient-gender dummies does not alter the signiﬁcance
f the main effects. At high stakes, migrants still send signiﬁcantly more when the remittance arrives as cash, although
he point estimate is higher (127.50 relative to 50.37). Also, the interactions between the gender dummies and the main
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Table 6
Preference for groceries or cash at $200?†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount sent amount
cash  200 26.00 7.590 -51.88 -57.42 -67.10 -90.32 -9.865 -44.57
(26.52) (24.49) (58.62) (62.59) (61.92) (65.46) (70.06) (61.99)
migrant gender (mg) 29.45 26.23 23.30 11.84 20.46 12.88 11.35 11.67
(19.63) (17.20) (30.18) (30.44) (30.19) (29.74) (30.27) (29.52)
mg  * cash 200 16.37 21.95 20.14 25.14 8.464 15.17
(46.87) (47.09) (46.19) (45.84) (47.16) (46.10)
recipient gender (rg) 17.66 31.88 14.88 25.14 23.40 24.86
(31.44) (32.65) (31.99) (31.20) (32.13) (30.86)
rg  * cash 200 54.74 48.76 74.06 76.58 69.56 71.76
(58.83) (64.47) (63.75) (63.30) (64.07) (62.17)
risk  preferencea -3.799
(17.20)
time preferenceb 27.74
(27.13)
trustc -5.249
(13.09)
altruism (1=selﬁsh)d -15.03
(19.32)
repayment motive 64.24
(42.06)
expectations motive 28.07
(16.93)
grocery preference (gp) -8.552
(33.54)
gp  * cash 200 55.34
(49.78)
normative spending (ns) 16.26
(38.17)
ns  * cash 200 -73.31
(54.57)
last  remittance (lr) 1.670
(1.606)
lr  * cash 200 -4.158
(2.987)
Constant 51.66** 67.91*** 56.44* 82.51* 53.18 64.95* 57.88 57.46*
(20.29) (22.85) (33.34) (47.27) (32.84) (34.83) (41.60) (32.44)
‡ 105.0 90.27 86.69 83.70 82.65 82.26 82.39 81.60
(7.660) (6.499) (6.236) (6.218) (6.136) (6.111) (6.220) (6.046)
Observations 133 132 132 122 122 122 119 122
Log  likelihood -674.6 -652.6 -647.8 -600.4 -599.2 -598.7 -581.3 -597.1
Pseudo-R2 0.0320 0.0610 0.0679 0.0702 0.0721 0.0728 0.0745 0.0754
Interactionse N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Qualitativef N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
† Tobit estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ‡ Analogous to the square root of the residual variance in an OLS regression.
Data  pooled across all treatments. Groc 200 is the baseline and cash 200 is the comparison. The other treatment dummies are included in all columns but
not  reported.
a Based on a hypothetical Binswanger (1980) style lottery choice framework.
a Based on a hypothetical Binswanger (1980) style lottery choice framework. b Based on choices over hypothetical amounts of money today versus in one
month.
c Based on the frequency with which the migrant lends money when asked. d This is based on a hypothetical dichotomous choice dictator game.
e Whether interactions between the other treatment dummies and the respective covariates are included. f Whether qualitative dummies are included.
N=no,  Y=yes.
treatment dummy  are not signiﬁcant, suggesting that in this speciﬁcation, men  and women  behave no differently across
groceries and cash. At low stakes, all effects continue to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
In the remaining columns (4 through 8), we  assess robustness of the ﬁndings in column 3 by adding different sets of
covariates. Column 4 includes the following covariates to control for other dimensions of preferences: (1) risk (based on a
hypothetical Binswanger, 1980, style lottery); (2) time (discount rates based on a hypothetical time preference question); (3)
trust (based on the frequency with which the respondent lends money); and (4) altruism (based on a hypothetical dictator
game). At high stakes (Table 5), the signiﬁcance of the main treatment effect is unchanged, although the point estimate is
lower (111.10 relative to 127.50). However, we  note that both the migrant’s gender and its interaction with the treatment
dummy  now become signiﬁcant. This suggests that, after controlling for risk, time, and social preferences, male migrants
(relative to women) send signiﬁcantly lower amounts overall, but signiﬁcantly higher amounts when stakes are high and
the remittance arrives as cash. At low stakes, all effects continue to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
m
a
t
t
m
b
6
s
s
(
A
t
i
r
a
a
s
w
e
5
(
h
m
c
f
o
g
m
c
b
i
o
r
b
f
a
A
d
S
t
B
R
U
o
a
M
C
aM.  Torero, A. Viceisza / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) 221–236 235
Column 5 of Tables 5 and 6 expands the speciﬁcations in column 3 by adding two covariates to control for other remittance
otives elicited through the post-survey: (1) a dummy  for repaying one’s family (for example for investments in education)
nd (2) a dummy  for the recipient expecting remittances. The main effects are similar to those in column 4. At high stakes,
he signiﬁcance of the main treatment effect is unchanged. Furthermore, both the migrant’s gender and its interaction with
he treatment dummy  are signiﬁcant. At low stakes, all effects continue to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
The post-survey also collected stated measures that proxy for migrants’ preferences for remittance spending. The ﬁrst
easure, grocery preference (gp), is a dummy  that takes the value one if the migrant stated that she prefers remittances
eing spent on groceries versus other categories such as savings and investments (25% prefers grocery spending). Column
 includes this dummy  and its interaction with the main treatment effect. At high stakes, the effects become even more
igniﬁcant than in columns 4 and 5, while at low stakes, the effects remain insigniﬁcant. The second measure, normative
pending (ns), is a dummy  that takes the value one if the migrant stated that a budget of $400 should fully be spent on groceries
73% says it should be spent on groceries). Column 7 includes this dummy  and its interaction with the main treatment effect.
t high stakes, the main treatment effect is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level, but migrant gender and its interaction with the
reatment dummy  are now insigniﬁcant. At low stakes, all effects continue to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
Finally, we assess whether migrants’ decisions are responsive to a proxy for the remittance cycle external to the exper-
ment. We construct a variable, last remittance (lr), that measures the number of weeks since the migrant last sent a
emittance. As column 8 suggests, at high stakes, the main treatment effect is unaltered from the previous columns. In
ddition, the migrant’s gender and its interaction with the main treatment dummy are signiﬁcant as in columns 4–6. We
lso note that lr and its interaction with the treatment dummy  are signiﬁcant. These effects suggest that the longer it has been
ince the migrant sent a remittance, the more she sends overall and in the high-stakes grocery treatment. This is consistent
ith migrants seeing groceries as a basic necessity that needs to be fulﬁlled prior to any other spending. At low stakes, all
ffects continue to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
. Conclusion
We  conduct a remittance ﬁeld experiment with Salvadoran migrants in the metropolitan DC area to test whether full
relative to no) control over remittance spending affects migrants’ remittance behavior.
Our quantitative ﬁndings suggest that migrants prefer a remittance to arrive as cash than as groceries when stakes are
igh ($400), but not when they are low ($200). This result is robust to inclusion of a wide set of covariates (such as the
igrant’s and the recipient’s gender as well as the migrant’s risk, time, and social preferences) and is consistent with a
onceptual framework in which migrants have preferences over how recipients spend remittances.
Our qualitative ﬁndings suggest that migrants integrate amounts sent in the experiment with the external environment
or sending remittances. Approximately 80% of migrants report that they base the amount sent in the experiment on their
wn ﬁnancial need (relative to the recipient’s) and their typical cycle for sending remittances.
When controlling for migrants’ qualitative reasons in the quantitative assessment, we  ﬁnd that migrants have an even
reater preference for cash (over groceries) at high stakes. We  explore the mechanisms underlying this effect and ﬁnd that
igrants who more recently sent a remittance and, in certain speciﬁcations, male migrants exhibit a greater preference for
ash. The former ﬁnding in particular is consistent with a framework in which migrants consider spending on groceries to
e a basic necessity that should have priority over other types of spending.
Overall, two potential implications emerge from our results. The ﬁrst implication is methodological and indicates that
t is important to be able to assess how subjects integrate decisions within an experiment with decisions in the naturally-
ccurring environment. Qualitative reports can be a complementary way  to collect such data. The second implication is
elated to policy. Remittance products should give recipients sufﬁcient spending ﬂexibility. While control over spending may
e desirable as suggested by previous literature (and possibly by the null effect at low stakes), migrants have a preference
or cash at high stakes. As such, experimentation with remittance products that offer controlled liquidity may  be a useful
venue for future research.
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